In this book, we attempt to make a comparative evaluation of modern macroeconomic schools: Monetarism and New Classical School based on the Classical System that envisage automatic full employment or natural rate of unemployment (NRU) equilibrium (AFNE or ANRUE) vs. New Keynesian and Post-Keynesian Economics based on the Keynesian System which gives unemployment equilibrium (UNE) or non-automatic NRU equilibrium (NANRUE) due to insufficiency of aggregate demand.

In order to determine which school is relevant, first the basic assumptions of these systems are compared: i) rational vs. adjusted vs. heterogeneous expectations, ii) existence of perfect competition in all markets leading to flexibility of prices and wages vs. imperfect competition giving rise to rigidities, and iii) presence or lack of coordination between markets.

In the final phase of our evaluations the performance of the developed economies are surveyed to establish whether we meet with AFNE or ANRUE or else UNE or NANRUE; and whether policy prescriptions devised by respective schools solve or alleviate the problem at hand when implemented.

Our investigations point out that New Keynesian and Post-Keynesian schools are more relevant compared to Monetarism and New Classical School. The choice between New Keynesian and Post-Keynesian Economics, however, is more difficult to make although New Keynesian Economics seems more widespread than Post-Keynesian Economics. Objectively, Post-Keynesian assumptions seem more realistic; normatively, however, New Keynesian stands seems more fit to the present day move towards globalization.

Underlying all these questions of right is the question how they are to be secured and maintained. By enforcing the responsibility of the executive and legislature to the community as a whole? Such is the general answer, and it indicates one of the lines of connection between the general theory of liberty and the doctrine of universal suffrage and the sovereignty of the people. The answer, however, does not meet all the possibilities of the case. The people as a whole might be careless of their rights and incapable of managing them. They might be set on the conquest of others, the expropriation of the rich, or on any form of collective tyranny or folly. It is perfectly possible that from the point of view of general liberty and social progress a limited franchise might give better results than one that is more extended. Even in this country it is a tenable view that the extension of the suffrage in 1884 tended for some years to arrest the development of liberty in various directions. On what theory does the principle of popular sovereignty rest, and within what limits does it hold good? Is it a part of the general principles of liberty and equality, or are other ideas involved? These are among the questions which we shall have to examine.

1. T. HOBHOUSE – 1911